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So as said, the above model is a pretty good starting point, but achieving a significant improvement from the current status quo by achieving the above two goals to good degree will require some modifications, and in particular the following two things:. One way to improve on that is to allow individual token holders to pull out their relative share, pro rata mentioned above at any time.
It gives more investor control of their money, but the downside is that it also creates higher instability for the dev team fund, limiting possible long-term planning. This requires a good governance system, and preferably one based on reputation rather than on stake. As mentioned, there are many more tweaks, and the best way to explore them all is via real-world experimnetations.
Finally, the above suggestion is a great step ahead. The next big steps would be to come up with:. Exploring the Game Theory side imagine a scenario where an incumbent sees a project that attacks their market share and that the project is funded by a DAICO. The developers could self-destruct the contract at this point, return funds and start a new DAICO but there is nothing to stop this process repeating.
If I am a cash rich attacker there is nothing to stop me choking DAICO funded startups and eventually getting my stake back. PoD is modular in the way that a function can be called upon the timing of donation, making it easy to expand the functionality of your ICO. As a result, other formats e. This time, we implemented the specification as DaicoPoD, and it is assumed to be used with other Proof of Donation base contracts.
In order to raise the tap or go into Withdraw mode, you need to send a proposal to the contract. To do this, create a new proposal using the submitProposal function. This function can be executed after the previous proposal has been aggregated. In order to be able to execute submitProposal, an account must deposit a minimum of 30, Token to the contract. This token quantity is an example. The aggregateVotes function can be executed by anyone after the voting period has ended. Based on the aggregation result of the proposal, the tap is raised or shift to withdraw mode.
If the withdraw mode is passed in a voting, the contract prohibits any new token deposits. Depending on the balance of the tokens already deposited, it is now possible for token holders to extract ether. As a matter of concern, if a malicious user has an account that is able to execute submitProposal, it is possible to intentionally continue to submit malicious proposals after each other to the contract. It might be required to add the functionality of certain discipline algorithms e.
Slasher, an appropriate burn model. This architecture may change in future. I still think the path of least resistance involves private financing, followed by a ICO liquidation event. I mean, would you hold onto a bunch of arcade tokens, hoping that you could get to play more games with those same tokens in the future?
If the tap amount influences the token price in the exchanges, investors will not have an incentive to reduce it, specially at the beginning of the project where is hard to evaluate the performance of the team. Then as time passes by and more money is in the hand of the developers another issues like the sunken cost fallacy will come into play, reducing those incentives even more.
There are many examples of these behaviors, Theranos for example, while valuation kept growing most of the investors basically ignored the performance of the company, and then even after the crisis started they gave her more money trying to save their investment or at least part of it. As nisdas said, I also think this model relies too much on the players being rational and honest, a solution could be to instead of getting all the money during the ICO, investors are given a right of first refusal on monthly sales and the right to vote on the tap rate, so they have the incentive to keep the token price low so they can continue investing and high so previously bought tokens keep gaining value.
I think that investors will get scammed, over and over again until they become more risk adverse. Eventually ICO investors will want to know more about projects and perform deeper investigations of teams. Teams that want to be successful with their ICO will need to satisfy these newly risk adverse investors that they are who they say they are and that they will do what they say they will do.
To look at it another way, what is the true underlying problem you seek to fix? Is it that many unscrupulous people are launching ICOs and making off with the cash? Or is it that naive or risky investors are continuing to fund the teams that will eventually run off with the cash?
If the true problem is the latter then I think we are currently seeing the market do what it is supposed to do. It is punishing risky investments. In reality that might just cost too much money and require more tokens to be available for purchase than is realistic, but it is still a theoretical possibility. It would increase investor confidence, theoretically bringing in more investment money.
If it worked well it would short circuit bad actors, which is clearly a positive, but that would the effect of that be? I guess it would mean that someone like me could invest without investigating as much. But that in turn will result in less engaged investors - or least allow for the comfort of less engaged investors.
Really like your arguments! We are doing something similar at https: I also agree with you about Ethereum to focus on scaling and not governance. That said, this kind of framework needs to be designed for creating a space to fund execution of more ideas that normally would not get traction. Ethereum brings a wider audience to fund an idea and so governance is going to be part of it, but how far the governance goes in fueling an idea is the question.
Well, the thing I think is the most valuable is avoiding over-regulation, the market may be punishing risky investments but it may force the government to take action, specially if the number of risky investors are too high, and when this happens governments tend to overregulate. For entrepreneurs, ICOs provide a refreshing model for capital formation that reduces exposure to activist investors. In practice, most people probably agree, we need to strike a balance between stakeholder and team control to reduce Lambo ICOs and exit scams which has leads us to fixate on lowering team control.
Giving the power to someone else does not solve the problem. Blockchains work by diluting power and inhibiting its concentration. The critical issues with ICOs are 1 teams are raising irresponsible amounts of capital without delivering a product or demonstrating competency and 2 tokens are listed before products are available. The visceral response seems to be a desire to move control away from the teams, but DAICOs open the door to activist investors that plague the legacy system and force companies into short-term quarterly thinking.
The key problem is not investor control but rather a premature listing of tokens which incentivizes short-term investing, creating bubble thinking and fueling investor greed. Innovation is hard, and it takes time to run experiments and refine products. Instead of giving control to the investors, we need to change the incentive system to reward long-term thinking and investment strategies. ICO teams should plan to conduct more fundraiser rounds and delay token tradability until after the company matures.
This solves the Lambo ICO problem and delays the liquidity point for investors which encourages more responsible and long-term investing. Investors need to know they are funding innovation and it will be a long time before they can access the asset. They should seriously consider if it is worth locking up valuable ETH to support an unproven idea.
The core issue that I see here is a practical one: Hence people running a responsible business are cashing out large amounts of ETH to manage their liquidity. This is not going to work in the proposed model and does require some form of stable token. I really like this idea for governance for truly decentralized projects e. Ethereum in which the network can subsist without the founders or off-chain components. The scheme does not have infinite security; as I mention, if both the vote mechanism and the developer are corrupted, then DAICOs do not solve the problem.
But this is much less likely than just one of the two having an issue. It is though more common for founders to be screwed by the VCs then the other way around, http: And for the founder to have stable founding without getting screwed? Have been having great feedback from the community on the need for the escrow mechanism. I tried to write my thoughts here: Complete pump-and-dump scam, Lambo ICO.
This is unbelievable and a significant source of the coming explosion. So as said, the above model is a pretty good starting point, but achieving a significant improvement from the current status quo by achieving the above two goals to good degree will require some modifications, and in particular the following two things: The next big steps would be to come up with: Mitigating this might involve a minimum tap rate for a mimimum period of time to ensure that there is some economic disincentive to this.
Contribution mode Currently, we support the following methods: A voter must deposit at least 15, tokens to participate in the voting process this amount is an example. The optimal amount of tokens need to be examined in the future All voters must call a voting function during a set voting period. The tokens of the accounts that participated in the voting will be locked for that period.
The submitProposal and aggregateVotes functions are implemented as follows: Start time of voting for new proposal nextCloseTime: Amount of tap to be effective with a new proposal isDestruct: Whether this proposal aims to shift to Withdraw mode eliminating the fund Withdraw mode If the withdraw mode is passed in a voting, the contract prohibits any new token deposits. We are waiting for your comments and contributions!
What if the team itself raises the tap value by vote manipulation e. Anyway just my two cents.